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An Empirical Analysis of the  
Off-Balance Sheet Activities of Indian Banks 
 
1. Introduction 
The world of finance, throughout its history has typified the well-known adage ‘nothing is 
permanent, except change’. The last three decades in particular have been witness to fundamental, 
one may even say cataclysmic, upheavals in financial innovations. As Santemero and Trester 
(1998) have observed, the financial sector is increasingly viewed as critical to enhancing 
economic growth.   
An important dimension of this financial innovations process has been an upsurge in 
off-balance sheet (OBS) activities of banks2. Such activities, though not entirely new from a 
historical perspective, have expanded considerably in range and scope in recent years.  Several 
empirical studies pertaining to OBS activities are available in the U.S. context, where the 
phenomenon seems to be most widespread (Jagtiani et al., 1995a, b). However, OBS activities 
have also registered a significant presence in European banking and, to a lesser extent, in banking 
systems of Asian economies (Fung and Cheng, 2004). 
Despite the emerging literature in this area for developed banking markets, limited 
evidence seems to have been forthcoming for emerging markets. The paper attempts to bridge 
this gap in the literature by focusing on Indian banking sector as a case study. We focus on India 
for three main reasons. First, with the dismantling of the erstwhile administered rate regime, 
market risks have come to the fore in  business decisions of corporates and financial institutions. 
More specifically, with growing integration of the Indian forex market with its global 
counterparts, and simultaneously with banks being allowed to create liabilities and assets in 
multi-currencies, foreign exchange risks have become prominent. Accordingly, instruments that 
allow for hedging of such risks have also gained in popularity. Second, given the growing 
competition and the pressure on their bottomlines, banks have increasingly made forays into 
newer domains of operation in order to augment their fee income and as a consequence, OBS 
business has gained in prominence. Finally and most importantly, over the past several years, 
significant policy initiatives have been undertaken by the authorities which have provided a boost 
                                                 
2Broadly speaking, OBS products comprise of four categories viz., (i) swap and hedging transactions (ii) bank 
guarantees (iii) loan commitments and (iv) investment banking activities.  
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for banks to engage in OBS activities.3 In view of this slew of developments, OBS activity by 
commercial banks increased significantly. These developments make the Indian banking sector an 
ideal ground for empirically exploring the factors influencing OBS activities.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief 
survey of the relevant literature and explain the position of the present paper in this context. 
Subsequently, the framework of the empirical analysis is presented. A basic equation is 
postulated, which models OBS items as financial innovations subject to a logistic diffusion 
pattern. The variables which may affect the diffusion of OBS activities such as bank 
characteristics, regulatory factors and macroeconomic variables are also discussed. The data 
sources are explained in section 4, while section 5 discusses the empirical results.  The 
concluding remarks are gathered in the final section.  
 
2. Existing Literature 
It is postulated that while OBS activities generate fee income for banks, they also potentially 
increase bank risk (Koppenhaver and Stover, 1991; Avery and Berger, 1991a). One popular 
hypothesis for the dramatic growth of bank OBS activities has been that banks may have used 
them as a means of augmenting earnings to offset reduced spreads on traditional on-balance sheet 
corporate lending business. Furthermore, the incentives to increase OBS risk may have been 
exacerbated by a flat-rate deposit insurance premium and capital requirements that did not take 
into OBS activities and risks.  
There have been a number of studies that have examined the key motivations  
underpinning OBS activities of banks; however, the results have been mixed. One group of 
studies has investigated whether banks engage in OBS activities in order to reduce ‘regulatory 
                                                 
3Salient policy initiatives that have been undertaken over the last several years and which provided impetus to the 
development of the derivatives market include the following. First, the Reserve Bank has imparted flexibility to asset-
liability managers by introducing Forward Rate Agreements (FRAs) and Interest Rate Swaps (IRS) as risk mitigation 
strategies. Second, following the recommendations of the L.C.Gupta Committee, the Government has amended the 
Securities Contract Regulation Act, 1956 and recognized derivatives as securities. The amended definition is broad and 
covers securitisation instruments also. Third, in June 2000, both the Mumbai Stock Exchange and the National Stock 
Exchange have introduced Stock Index Futures. Effective March 1, 2000, the Government has lifted the ban on forward 
rate contracts and cleared the way for forward contracts in debt securities. This is the basis for index based futures in 
the debt market. A major bottleneck in the development of the derivatives market had been the absence of a reliable 
structure of benchmark interest rates, for different maturities. With a view to fill this gap, National Stock Exchange 
decided to experiment with the idea of ascertaining the expectations of major market participants in arriving at 
indicative benchmark rates. Based on a daily poll of over 25 market participants, NSE started disseminating since 1998 
its overnight money market rates called NSE Mumbai Inter-bank Bid and Offer (MIBOR/MIBID) rates. These rates 
have since gained wide acceptance in the market. Subsequently, the Report of the Working Group on Rupee 
Derivatives recommended, inter alia, introduction of exchange-traded derivatives to supplement the OTC derivatives. 
It recommended four types of contracts for trading: (a) short-term MIBOR futures contract, (b) MIFOR futures contract 
based on 6-month LIBOR and Rupee-Dollar 6-month forward rate, (c) bond futures contract and (d) long-term bond 
index futures contract. 
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taxes’. Jagtiani (1995a) and Pavel and Philis (1987) find that banks with binding capital 
constraints are more likely to engage in swaps and loan securitization than banks with excess 
capital. These results are also consistent with Baer and Pavel (1987) who find that banks engage 
in loan securitization and standby letters of credit (SLCs) to avoid reserve requirements and 
deposit insurance premiums. However, these empirical findings are not consistent with those of 
Benveniste and Berger (1987) and Koppenhaver (1989), who find that  binding  capital 
constraints are not a significant factor in a bank’s decision to engage in SLCs and other OBS 
guarantees.  
A second group of studies has examined the relationship between bank OBS activities 
and risk. Thus, Avery and Berger (1991b) find that better-performing banks tend to issue more 
OBS commitments – a finding that is inconsistent with the capital avoidance hypothesis which 
suggests that banks with low capital (i.e., binding minimum capital constraints) are more likely to 
engage in OBS activities.  
In a much-discussed contribution, Jagtiani et al. (1995) view OBS products as financial 
innovations subject to ‘autonomous’ logistic diffusion process.  While each of these hypotheses 
has considerable intellectual appeal, it is doubtful whether any of them in isolation can explain 
such a complex phenomenon as OBS banking.  Hence, attention has been devoted in recent years 
towards pursuing an eclectic approach, letting the data ‘speak for itself’ via a suitable 
econometric model. 
This paper extends the work of Jagtiani et al. (1995) in several respects. First, the focus is 
on the determinants of diffusion pattern of OBS activities of banks in India. Second, a bank-level 
panel data is constructed and panel data estimation techniques are used. The third extension is 
that the empirical analysis considers not only bank-specific features, but also macroeconomic 
conditions and regulatory features as determinants of OBS diffusion. Moreover, the actual speed 
of diffusion of OBS activities for each bank group has also been estimated. 
Even though the literature on OBS activities is extensive, empirical research with 
respect to Indian banks is scarce. In one of the earliest studies, Nachane and Ghosh (2002) 
observed that higher levels of capital and liquid assets lowered the incentive of banks to engage in 
OBS activities. However, the paper considered a limited time span and importantly, it confined 
itself only to public sector banks, which limited the empirical appeal of the model.  
The purpose of this paper is to fill this void by empirically investigating OBS activities 
of the banking sector in India, both over a longer time span and across the banking system in its 
entirety.  Empirical evidence and knowledge of the diffusion pattern of OBS activities in India is 
important for several reasons. First, prudential regulators need to be aware of the determinants of 
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OBS diffusion. Second, financial innovations, such as OBS activities, and their regulation affect 
the costs and scope of financial intermediation and therefore, the process of monetary policy 
transmission (Bernanke, 1986). Considering the fact that the most of the studies on OBS activities 
are confined to the OECD group of countries, a systematic investigation of these aspects in the 
context of emerging markets has been a long felt need.  It is expected that the study will go some 
way towards addressing this deficiency. 
 
3.  Data Sources 
The published sources of data in emerging markets rarely encompass bank-specific statistics in 
sufficient depth to enable a satisfactory panel data analysis. A considerable part of the effort was, 
therefore, devoted to the construction of a bank-level panel database from the balance sheets of 
individual banks. Such a database enables not only an identification of  the determinants of OBS 
activities, but also an  examination of  the differing diffusion patterns of OBS items across the 
three major categories of banks in India. 
The data for the study was primarily sourced from two annual RBI publications, the 
Statistical Tables relating to Banks in India and the Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in 
India, supplemented with information from the Performance Highlights of Banks, an yearly 
publication of Indian Banks’ Association, the self-regulatory body of Indian banks. The former 
database provides bank-wise information on balance sheets and profit and loss accounts of 
commercial banks in India whereas the latter provides information about bank-wise prudential 
ratios like capital adequacy and non-performing loans. The choice of the sample banks proceeded 
in three steps. First, as a starting point, we chose all commercial banks over the sample period 
beginning 1996 through 2004.4 This gave us a total of 90 banks over the sample period. In the 
second step, in view of the fact that the OBS activities of old private banks are negligible in 
magnitude vis-à-vis their new private/foreign counterparts, this category of banks were excluded 
from the analysis. In the third and final step, we deleted  the ‘outlier’ foreign banks (those with 
exceedingly high capital adequacy ratio and/or single bank branches) and foreign banks which 
were not in existence over the entire sample period, (probably owing to the extensive 
mergers/acquisitions activity prevailing in this segment internationally). Accordingly, the final 
sample comprised of a balanced panel of 60 commercial banks over the sample period with 27 
public sector banks, 8 new private banks and 25 foreign banks together accounting for about 90 
% of the total assets of the Indian banking sector. 
 6
 
 
 
4.  Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, the present study adopts an eclectic approach.  The variables 
selected as likely determinants of OBS activities fall into four broad categories: (a) autonomous 
diffusion, (b) bank-specific characteristics, (c) regulatory factors and (d) macroeconomic 
conditions 
For the purpose of our analysis, we adopt the logistic diffusion model. Such a diffusion 
model has been employed by Jagtiani et al. (1995a) and has also been employed in other areas of 
financial innovation (Hannan and McDowell, 1987 for instance, studied the adoption of ATMs 
using this methodology). The underlying hypothesis of the logistic innovation model takes the 
form of equation (1) below. 
mt+1 – mt = β (n – mt) mt/n  (β>0)                                                                                   (1) 
Here mt is the number of firms that have already adopted the innovation at time t and n is 
the total number of firms in the industry. The framework assumes that the number of banks that 
adopt an innovation between time t and t+1, is proportionate to the product of the number of non-
adopting banks at time t and the proportion of banks that have already adopted the innovation at 
time t. The constant of proportion (β) represents the speed of adoption and depends on several 
factors such as the characteristics of the innovation and the features of banks in the industry. 
If the period t to t+1 is small, the solution of the differential equation (1) can be written as 
(2) below.  
where α is the constant of integration.  
The equation represents the well-known logistic curve, which predicts that the proportion 
of the population having adopted the innovation will increase at an accelerating rate until 50 % 
adoption (half of the population) is attained at time –(α/β). Thereafter, adoption increases at a 
decelerating rate, and 100 % adoption is reached asymptotically. This logistic prediction of 
innovation adoption has been justified on imitative and bandwagon behaviour.  
Given an appropriate transformation, the panel structure of the data yields the basic 
equation to estimate: 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 The starting point of the sample coincides with two important developments. First, the new private banks which were 
licensed post-reforms, became operational from this year onwards. Second, this was also the year the Reserve Bank of 
India, began publishing bank-wise prudential ratios. 
)2()]exp(1/[1/ tnmP tt βα −−+==
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In equation (3), Pit is defined as the amount of OBS items divided by the amount of total 
assets (total of on-balance sheet plus OBS items) of bank i at time t. The main argument for this 
step, also made by Jagtiani et al. (1995) is that it enables to take into account the scale on which 
banks introduce OBS items. The model we employ in the paper is an extension of (3) to 
incorporate the effects of regulatory factors.  
Depending on the features of the unobservable bank-specific effect αi, a two-way 
typology of error component regression models can be distinguished. In the fixed effects model 
(FEM), αi is a separate constant term for each bank: αi =α1d1+α2d2+…+αjdj, with the dj’s being 
bank-specific dummy variables. In the random effects model (REM), αi is a bank-specific 
disturbance: αi =α+ui where E(ui)=0 and V(ui)=σ2 and Cov (ξit, ui)=0. Thus, FEM treats the αi’s as 
constants and the REM as mutually independent random variables that are independent of the 
error term. The question of whether the effect is fixed or random is statistically determined using 
the Hausman specification test.  
  In line with our eclectic approach, the study identifies, in the Indian context, several 
potential determinants of OBS activities based on the both the existing theoretical literature as 
well as those emanating from policy discussions (see endnote 2). The econometric model 
employed was specified to account for the relative importance of the aforesaid factors. 
Accordingly, the following modification of (3) was proposed: 
ittiti
it
it
it YXtP
P
LGTOBS εδγβα ++++=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−= 1ln                                                    (4)  
where, i = 1,2,…,N denotes the number of banks and t = 1,2,…,T is the number of years and 
Pit is as described earlier. Following Jagtiani et al. (1995a), the dependent variable LGTOBSit is a 
logistic transformation of Pit. Let us refer to the model represented by (4) as Model I. The anlysis 
for this model could be done at the aggregate level (without distinguishing different categories of 
banks) or at the disaggregated level in which bank categories are distinguished using dummy 
variables DUMMY1 (for public sector banks) and DUMMY2 (for foreign banks). Needless to say 
the dummy coefficients have to be interpreted relative to the omitted variable (private banks). The 
latter results for Model I are reported in Table 3.  
We also introduce a variant of (4), in which we allow the speed of diffusion to vary across 
bank categories, by introducing two dummy variables D1 and D2 to correspond respectively, to 
the categories of private sector and foreign banks. (The omitted dummy pertains to public sector 
)3()
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banks, where we thought the speed of diffusion could be slowest). This model is as described in 
(5) below and may be referred to as Model II. 
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ln                              (5) 
The results for Model II are reported in reported in Table 4 .  
The explanatory variables correspond to the three categories listed in Section 1. 
(i) The time trend t accounts for the autonomous diffusion, 
(ii) Yt is a vector of general macroeconomic conditions, 
(iii) Xit is a vector of bank-specific characteristics (classified into regulatory and non-
regulatory variables),  
(iv) The intercept α is a bank-specific constant, intended to capture bank-specific fixed 
effects. 
The explanatory variables, their definitions and economic rationale are summarised in 
Table 1.  A brief discussion of these points may, however, be in order. 
The coefficient β on the time trend is intended to capture the autonomous speed of 
diffusion and depends on factors such as financial technology, learning, preferences and 
‘financial literacy’ in general. The adoption of OBS items is more rapid, the larger the β. 
 
4.1 Bank-specific factors 
(i) The expected impact of bank size on OBS activities is ambiguous.  On the one hand, a 
bank needs to be of a certain threshold size, before it can realize the scale and scope economies 
associated with OBS activities. Additionally, only large banks may be able to command the 
specialized management skills needed for handling OBS products. Large and sophisticated 
clients, who are most likely to demand OBS products, may also favour large banks on grounds of 
their perceived safety (the ‘too-big-to-fail’ syndrome). But it may be equally true, on the other 
hand, that large banks are more risk-diversified with less incentives to use OBS products. 
(ii) The loan ratio (ratio of loans to total assets), tends to be directly related to OBS 
activities.  A higher loan ratio increases interest rate risks, creating inducements for hedging via 
OBS products (Angbazo, 1997). There is an additional reason for the positive association 
between the loan ratio and OBS activities. In the process of sanctioning loans, banks get access to 
proprietary information on their loan customers, thereby facilitating the offer of relevant OBS risk 
management tools by banks to such customers. 
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(iii) An important role in attracting OBS activities is played by a bank’s creditworthiness. 
In view of the difficulties in quantifying this concept, profitability (since it impinges favourably 
on creditworthiness), could stand in as a useful proxy. We expect profitability to positively affect 
the scale of OBS activities   
 
4.2 Regulatory factors 
In line with the analysis of Jacques and Nigro (1997), we introduce the concept of 
regulatory pressure both with regard to capital adequacy and non-performing assets (NPAs). As 
regards net NPAs to net advances ratio (NNPA), the Union Budget for 1998-99 provided certain 
functional autonomy to banks with regard to their personnel management policies. An important 
component of the autonomy process applied only to banks having a NNPA ratio not exceeding 9 
%, which we adopt as the benchmark for computing regulatory pressure for NPAs. Specifically, 
the regulatory pressure variable is defined as the difference between the inverse of the bank’s 
actual NNPA and the inverse of the benchmark ratio of 9 %. Because banks with NNPA above 
and below the 9 % stipulation may react differently, the study partitioned regulatory pressure into 
two variables: NPAH and NPAL.  
NPAH = max {0, (1/9-1/NNPA)} 
NPAL = max {0, (1/NNPA-1/9)} 
NPAH applies to all banks with high NNPA (greater than 9 %).  In their attempt to 
‘gamble for resurrection’ by cutting back on loan portfolio (which attracts a risk weight), these 
banks might be tempted to indulge in greater OBS activity (which does not attract risk weights), 
giving rise to a positive relation between NPAH and OBS activity. Banks with low NNPAs might 
be under less pressure to engage in OBS activities but their capacity to indulge in OBS  activities 
could be greater in view of their higher credit worthiness and hence the direction of relation   
between NPAL and OBS activities is uncertain. 
The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) affects the diffusion pattern of OBS items in two 
opposite directions. On the one hand, OBS activities are expected to be larger for banks with a 
high capital adequacy ratio, since they are considered most creditworthy. Alternately, a high 
capital adequacy ratio reduces banks’ marginal gain from increasing the risk in the asset portfolio 
(Furlong and Keeley, 1989). As bank capital increases, the ability to assume risks increases5, but 
                                                 
5The evidence on this point is by no means unequivocal. In a series of papers, Kim and Santomero (1988) and Koehn 
and Santomero (1980) have shown that increasing regulatory capital standards may have the effect of causing utility 
(shareholder value) maximizing banks to increase portfolio risk. Under these conditions, changes in capital and 
portfolio risk would be positively correlated. More recently, Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) derive the conditions under 
which bank risk and capitalization would be related by incorporating the incentives of three sets of agents: deposit 
insurer, shareholder and the manager. In order to address the ambiguity of the relation between capital and bank risk 
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the need for OBS products to hedge risk exposure may decrease. Accordingly, the second set of 
regulatory pressure variables is defined in respect of capital adequacy. In particular, the focus is 
on the response of banks to the 8% risk-based capital standards.6 In this case, we introduce 
analogous ratios CARL and CARH to signal the degree of regulatory pressure for low-capitalized 
(less than 8% CAR) and adequately capitalized (in excess of 8% CAR) banks respectively. High 
regulatory pressure with respect to capital implies low creditworthiness and can be expected to 
translate into lower OBS activity. On the other hand, low regulatory pressure, as implied by 
CARH, signifies comfortable capital position and (accompanied with a high credit rating) makes 
a bank an active supplier of OBS products (Koppenhaver and Stover, 1991). Alternately, low 
regulatory pressure also reduces the marginal bank of the bank from increasing the risk in its asset 
portfolio (Furlong and Keeley, 1989) and therefore, can be expected to act as a moderating 
influence on OBS activity. Thus the impact of CARH on OBS activity could go either way.  
 
4.3 Macroeconomic factors 
Two macroeconomic variables are considered in the empirical analysis: the growth rate g of real 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the difference between the long and the short-term interest 
rate7, termed as interest spread (INTSPRD). Real GDP growth captures the effects triggered by 
fluctuations in general economic activity. The demand for OBS products reacts positively to the 
stage of the business cycle due to a transactions motive. But obversely, it could also be argued 
that business risk decreases in periods of real growth, leading to less demand for risk management 
techniques.  
A high and positive INTSPRD signals both, a high degree of uncertainty about future 
interest rates and that short-term interest rates are expected to rise in the future. High interest rate 
risk and future interest rate rises imply a relatively high demand for OBS products. On the other 
hand, the spread also measures the substitution between OBS activities and traditional banking 
activities, i.e., between short-term funding and long-term lending. Periods with high and positive 
spreads thus favour traditional on-balance sheet activities and in such periods, bank managers 
will be less focused on earning profits with OBS activities. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
taking, following Jacques and Nigro (1997), we classify banks as those subject to high and low regulatory pressure with 
respect to capital.   
6 Upto end-March 1999, scheduled commercial banks had to comply with a stipulated CAR of 8 %. This ratio has been 
raised to 9 % effective April 1, 2000. 
7The long-term interest rate is proxied as the weighted average interest rate on 10-year Government paper, the weights 
being equal to the face value of bids received. The short-term interest rate is proxied as the weighted average on 91-day 
Treasury Bills, the weights being equal to the face value of the bids received. 
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5. Results and Discussion 
Table 2 lists the bank-group wise characteristics of the variables mentioned earlier in the study. 
Three major features emerge from an examination of different bank groups. First, OBS activity, 
on average, tends to be the highest for foreign banks, followed by new private and public sector 
banks. Secondly, public sector banks are dominant in terms of size, although the loan portfolio is 
the highest for new private banks, with pronounced variability. Foreign banks are smallest in 
terms of size but display the highest variability, with respect to this variable. Thirdly, foreign 
banks, registered the highest profits, and also showed high CARs, with marked variability evident 
in both; their CARs, though highest on average, also exhibited the greatest variability.  
So far as Model I is concerned (Table 3), we find that firstly, the trend variable was found 
to be positive and significant at conventional levels across all bank groups, its magnitude being 
the highest for the foreign bank group. This suggests that the diffusion of OBS activities has been 
particularly rapid for this bank group, and in terms of magnitude, the lowest for public sector 
banks.  
At the bank-specific level, bank size has a significantly negative impact in public sector 
and foreign banks, attesting to lack of economies of scale with respect to OBS activities. Second, 
significant informational diseconomies of scope between loans and OBS activity exist, especially 
for the new private and foreign bank groups. Finally, the profitability variable is significant for 
public sector and new private banks, attesting to the fact that higher OBS activity for these bank 
groups is derived more from profitability considerations than for foreign bank group. 
Among the regulatory variables, the coefficients found for the capital adequacy ratio 
indicate that capital constrained banks (CARH), especially those which are public sector, assume 
greater OBS risk and have an incentive to supply a larger volume of OBS items. On the other 
hand, new private and foreign banks with limited capital constraint are induced to supply a larger 
volume of OBS items. Likewise, banks with low NNPA, especially the public sector and foreign 
banks, were found to have a positive effect on OBS diffusion. On the other hand, new private 
banks with high regulatory pressure with respect to NNPA tend to have limited effect on OBS 
diffusion. 
Finally, both macro variables considered contributed significantly to the OBS diffusion 
pattern. Higher real GDP growth does not necessarily imply increasing OBS activity, at least for 
public sector and new private banks. This might be attributed to the fact that an upturn in 
economic activity lowers business risk and there is an incentive to supply a smaller volume of 
OBS items. On the other hand, the term INTSPRD has a negative and significant impact on OBS 
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diffusion for public sector banks, suggesting substitution between traditional (on-balance sheet) 
bank activities and OBS activities.  
The fit of the estimated equations seems to be good: the model explains anywhere 
between 69-81 % of the variance of the dependent variable. We also analyze the random effects 
model under the assumption of no bank-specific effect. The Chi-Square statistic convincingly 
rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting that the fixed effects setup is quite apt in the present 
context. 
In order to allow for the possibility that OBS diffusion differs across different bank type, 
we also estimate the base model, after incorporating dummies for new private and foreign bank 
groups. Given that the supply of OBS items is the lowest for public sector banks, this bank group 
is taken as the omitted category. The results of the analysis, presented in Table 4, broadly lend 
support to the earlier analysis of bank-specific analysis. As in the earlier case, the coefficient on 
the profit variable is insignificant, whereas size is found to exert a negative (and significant) 
effect on OBS diffusion. Informational diseconomies exist between loans and OBS diffusion as 
evidenced from the (negative) sign of the loan ratio. Not surprisingly, the macroeconomic 
variables, GDP and INTSPRD are also significant in the present analysis. This would seem to 
suggest that while these variables might be exerting a certain degree of influence on bank groups 
(viz., public sector and new private banks), as regards their OBS diffusion, even at the aggregate 
level, such influences turn out to be quite significant. Finally, both the dummy variables are 
positive and significant at conventional levels, suggesting that the effect of OBS diffusion has 
been significant for both these groups of banks. The sign on these coefficients indicate that 
relative to the public sector banks, OBS activity of the other two bank groups have been higher, 
particularly for the foreign bank segment. All in all, the results suggest that OBS activity has 
gained prominence in the Indian banking sector and, in turn, is a function of not only bank-
specific and regulatory factors, but also conditioned by the overall macroeconomic environment. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The empirical research reported in the literature has almost exclusively documented evidence on 
OBS diffusion in the US. The present study fills the existing gap in the literature regarding 
empirical evidence and knowledge of OBS activity in India.  
In summary, the estimation results show that bank-specific factors, regulatory factors and 
general macroeconomic conditions-all significantly affect the diffusion process of OBS items in 
India. In public sector and foreign banks, bank size seems to impose constraints on engaging in 
OBS products. The evidence shows significant diseconomies of scope between aggregated OBS 
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items and loans in the new private and foreign bank groups. The hypothesis that bank profitability 
(as a proxy for creditworthiness) is conducive to OBS activity is rejected in case of foreign banks. 
Regulatory factors seem to be an important consideration influencing OBS activity. Finally, the 
empirical results show that for the public sector banks, real GDP growth is a crucial variable, 
whereas the term spread affects OBS activities for public sector and new private banks. 
The empirical findings imply that not only regulation, but also market forces, captured by 
bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic conditions are at work in the diffusion pattern 
of OBS activities in India. From the policy angle, the study shows that different sets of bank-
specific, regulatory and macroeconomic factors are influential in affecting OBS diffusion. From 
the regulatory standpoint, while high regulatory pressure in respect of capital is dominant in case 
of public sector banks, non-performing assets seem to a prime concern across all bank groups. 
Among others, at the bank-specific level, size is an important consideration for all bank groups, 
while profits are a prime mover for public and new private banks. Finally, the macroeconomic 
environment seems to have played an important role in affecting OBS diffusion, more so for 
public sector and new private banks.  
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Table 1: Variables in the Empirical Model 
Variable  Expected sign Economic Rationale 
TIME + Time↑⇒OBS technology diffusion↑⇒OBS↑ 
I. Bank-specific Variables   
SIZE +/- Size ↑⇒ Scale economies↑⇒OBS↑ 
Size ↑⇒ Bank Risk↓⇒OBS↓ 
Loan ratio (LRATIO) + LOAN↑⇒Scope Economies and Risk↑ ⇒OBS↑ 
Profitability (PROFIT) + PROFIT↑ ⇒Creditworthiness↑⇒OBS↑ 
II. Regulatory Variables   
CARL +/- CARL↑⇒ Creditworthiness↑⇒OBS↑ 
CARL↑⇒Risk-taking capacity↑⇒OBS↓ 
CARH - CARH↑⇒ Creditworthiness↓⇒OBS↓ 
NPAL + NNPA↓⇒Creditworthiness↑⇒OBS↑ 
 
NPAH + NNPA↑⇒Gamble for Resurrection↑⇒OBS↑ 
III. Macro-economic Variables   
g +/- GDP↑⇒Economic Activity↑⇒OBS↑ 
GDP↑⇒Business Risk↓⇒OBS↓ 
INTSPRD +/- INTSPRD ↑⇒Uncertainty about interest 
rates↑⇒OBS↑ 
INTSPRD ↑⇒Traditional Banking ↑⇒OBS↓ 
Note: The variables are defined as follows: 
SIZE = Ln (Total Asset);  
LRATIO = (Loans/Total Assets)* 100; 
PROFIT = (Net Profit/Total Assets)*100 ;    
g = GDP growth rate 
CARH  = max {0, (1/8-1/CAR)}, where CAR is capital adequacy ratio of a bank 
CARL = max {0, (1/CAR -1/8)} 
NPAH = max {0, (1/9-1/NNPA)}, where  
NNPA = [Net non-performing loans/Total net loans] 
NPAL = max {0, (1/NNPA-1/9)} 
INTSPRD = interest rate spread between long-term and short-term interest rate (see Endnote 7) 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Bank Groups: 1995-96 to 2002-03 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
 Public New 
Pvt 
Foreign Public New 
Pvt. 
Foreign Public New 
Pvt 
Foreig
n 
Public New 
Pvt 
Foreig
n 
LGTOBS 0.249 0.828 4.287 0.130 0.634 5.191 0.774 2.939 0.002 0.025 0.121 48.430 
SIZE 4.331 3.695 3.041 0.374 0.533 0.693 5.610 5.098 4.536 3.494 2.108 1.484 
LRATIO 40.978 43.242 39.28 5.536 8.802 17.53 55.637 62.686 92.372 22.331 28.644 0.185 
PROFIT 0.562 0.849 0.932 0.973 1.797 3.972 1.761 2.862 37.659 -7.511 -11.27 -25.41 
CAR 10.725 15.386 22.09 4.354 19.09 26.69 20.120 22.380 44.340 -18.81 1.45 7.12 
NNPA 7.370 3.258 5.762 4.292 4.230 9.320 26.010 27.990 61.410 0.001 0.001 0.001 
For definitions of the variables occurring in the first column, see Notes to Table 1 
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Table 3: Empirical Estimation of OBS Activity for Banks (Model I) 
(Bank Group –wise Analysis) 
Variable/ Bank Group Public sector New Private Foreign 
Trend 0.012 *** 
(0.003) 
0.021***  
(0.005) 
0.218 ** 
(0.103) 
Bank-specific Variables    
SIZE -0.080* 
(0.048) 
-0.356* 
(0.211) 
-0.458*** 
(0.109) 
LRATIO 0.007 
(0.005) 
-0.026*** 
(0.008) 
-1.056** 
(0.434) 
PROFIT 0.019*** 
(0.008) 
0.128*** 
(0.071) 
0.101 
(0.086) 
Regulatory Variables     
CARL 0.186 
(0.518) 
-8.379** 
(3.973) 
-32.623* 
(19.262) 
CARH 0.044*** 
(0.012) 
0.004  
(0.006) 
4.991 
(9.352) 
NPAL -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0007 
(0.0009) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
NPAH 0.008 
(0.039) 
-0.155**  
(0.075) 
0.005 
(0.160) 
Macroeconomic Variables     
G -0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.041** 
(0.023) 
0.356 
(0.212) 
INTSPRD -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.054 
(0.068) 
0.038 
(0.235) 
Adjusted R2 0.685 0.786 0.811 
Number of banks 27 8 23 
Number of observations 243 72 203 
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.008 0.005 0.004 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively. 
Figures in brackets indicate standard errors. 
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Table 4: Empirical Estimation of OBS Activity for Banks (Model II) 
Variable/ Bank Group Coefficients  
Trend 0.156 *** 
(0.070) 
Bank-specific Variables  
SIZE -0.365*** 
(0.041) 
LRATIO -0.032** 
(0.014) 
PROFIT 0.088 
(0.058) 
Regulatory Variables   
CARL 23.688*** 
(8.138) 
CARH -0.017 
(0.023) 
NPAL -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
NPAH 0.069 
(0.096) 
Macroeconomic Variables   
g 0.154* 
(0.091) 
INTSPRD -0.020** 
(0.009) 
D1 (dummy variable) 
(New private banks=1) 
0.511*** 
(0.196) 
D2 (dummy variable)  
(Foreign banks=1) 
3.804*** 
(1.036) 
Adjusted R2 0.557 
No. of banks 58 
No. of Observations 518 
Hausman test (p-Value) 0.006 
              ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively. 
              Figures in brackets indicate standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
